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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of a change in the marginal costs of advertising on advertising 
expenditures of firms and consumer prices across industries. It makes use of a unique policy 
change that caused a decrease of the taxation on advertising expenditures in parts of Austria 
and a simultaneous increase in other parts. Advertising expenditures move immediately in the 
opposite direction to the marginal costs of advertising. Simultaneously the price reaction to 
advertising is negative in some industries (food, education) and positive in other industries 
(alcohol,  tobacco,  transportation,  hotels  and  restaurants),  depending  on  the  information 
content  of  advertising.  The  paper  reconciles  these  findings  using  a  model  that  contains 
informative and persuasive forces of advertising. 
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 F. Rauch, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
This paper studies the eect of a change of the marginal costs of advertising on advertising
expenditures and consumer prices. It makes use of a policy change in Austria, which aected
the marginal costs of advertising, and thus advertising expenditures. While previous works
have estimated the impact of advertising on consumer prices for certain goods, this is the rst
study that investigates the eect of advertising costs on consumer prices for all major industries
and representative data for an entire economy. As demonstrated below, advertising increases
consumer prices in some industries, and decreases them in others.
There are at least three important reasons why advertising has been of interest to economists:
First, advertising has been debated at length in the theoretical economic literature as it is
closely tied to the issues of information and search, topics that have taken a prominent place
in economic theory in recent decades. Advertising also features in models of entry barriers and
product quality. Throughout its long debates advertising has remained a controversial topic,
with contradicting policy recommendations, as discussed below. Detailed empirical evidence
might be helpful to guide this debate.
Second, advertising itself is an increasingly important business activity. In the United States
media advertising accounts for almost 2 percent of GDP, while in Europe typically for about
half that number.1 In Austria, on which this paper focuses, advertising accounted for a share
of 0.009 of GDP in 2000. This was a substantial increase from the year 1990, where the
share of advertising in GDP was only 0.0061 (see Grohall et al. 2007). Advertising is one of
the main sources of revenue for the media industry and the internet but also for cultural and
sporting events. Thus greater understanding of advertising is relevant for businesses in all these
industries.
Third, the demonstration of the eects of taxation of advertising, which this study provides,
meets a recurring policy idea, of which I mention only a few examples: While there are many
cities and towns worldwide that tax local advertising, there have also been frequent attempts to
introduce an advertising tax at state or national level. In 1987 the Florida legislature enacted
a sales tax on a range of services that included advertising. In a heavy storm of protests
the advertising tax was attacked as \unfair, unwise and unconstitutional" (Hellerstein 1988),
and repealed after only six months of installation. More recently, in Pennsylvania in 2006 the
senate discussed a bill (Senate Bill 854) that attempted to introduce a six percent sales tax
on advertising in that state, but was not enacted (see Philadelphia Business Journal 2006). In
Europe, the Slovak Republic charged a tax on all advertising expenditure which was eliminated
1The US data counts for the years 2001 to 2004 and was taken from Arkolakis (2008), while European
numbers come from Kosmelj and Zabkar (2008).
2when Slovakia entered the European Union in 2004. In 2008 the French president discussed
the taxation of advertising revenues of private television stations.2 Hence despite few actual
observations of taxations of advertising at state or national level, it remains a recurring and
important political subject, and an idea that is periodically discussed. Almost all countries
have laws that ban advertising of certain products like cigarettes or health related products.
The introduction of a ban on advertising of certain products may have a similar eect to a
substantial increase of an advertising tax.
For this investigation I make use of a policy change in Austria in 2000 that harmonized the
regional taxation on advertising expenditure, thus simultaneously increasing it in some parts
of the country while reducing it in others. A comparison of advertising expenditures of rms
in these two parts shows a strong and sudden impact of the change in advertising costs on
advertising expenditures, that is similar in magnitude across products from dierent industries.
To investigate the change of consumer prices I complement this data on advertising expenditures
with regional price indexes, and show that also consumer prices were immediately aected, but
dierently across industries.
Throughout the debate advertising has remained a controversial topic: Some economists have
argued that there are excessive amounts of advertising, which therefore may be a good target
for taxation, while others have suggested that underprovision of advertising might provide a
case for a subsidy.3 The main cause of this dierent advice has been identied to be that
advertising can be seen as persuasive or as informative (see Bagwell 2007). Butters (1977)
denes these two views as \advertising as a set of psychological ploys which induce consumers
to buy products or brands that they otherwise would not buy", or as \a provision of information
which allows consumers to make more discriminating choices within the framework of a xed
set of preferences." This distinction, however, goes further back at least to the work of Alfred
Marshall (1919) who dened similar categories with the names of combative and constructive
advertising. The persuasive view of advertising typically sees changes in preferences in the form
of an outward shift of demand, a decrease of elasticities of substitution between products, or
increased monopoly power of rms, and thus increasing market prices, while the informative
view sees increased information for consumers, stronger competition and thus lower market
prices. A closely related distinction was brought forward by Johnson and Myatt (2006), who
call the two types of advertising hype and real information.
2See the article Sarkozy's vision of a 'BBC' for France by Ben Hall in the Financial Times of January 8,
2008.
3Some examples of viewpoints among many others: Pigou suggested a tax on advertising in 1929, in addition
Dixit and Norman (1978) have argued for the possible presence of excessive amounts of advertising. Stivers and
Tremblay (2005) present the case for a subsidy. Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Stegeman (1991) present models
that can have both outcomes.
3An extreme example of the persuasive view was sketched by Pigou (1929) who wrote: \It
may happen that the expenditures on advertisement made by competing monopolists simply
neutralise one another, and leave the industrial position exactly as it would have been if neither
had expended anything. For clearly, if each of two rivals makes equal eorts to attract the favor
of the public away from the other, the total result is the same as it would have been if neither
had made any eort." This view might have been what Marshall had in mind when naming
persuasive advertising `combative advertising'. Similar views on advertising have been expressed
by Kaldor (1950) who asserts a harmful eect of advertising and suggests the introduction of a
tax on advertising. Further, Sutton (1974) makes the distinction between generated sales from
advertising and diverting sales from advertising, where the described case would be encountered
if there were only diverted and no generated sales. Finally, Gasmi et al. (1992) suggest that the
advertising game between Pepsi and Coca Cola is a predatory competition that hardly serves
to generate sales.
By the other view, advertising might serve as a transporter of information. This idea has been
formalized in models closely linked to the large literature on consumer search, but rather than
consumers searching for products, rms search for consumers via advertising. Here advertising
provides useful information to consumers such as the existence, the quality, or the price of a
good, see for example Butters (1977), Stahl (1989), or Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In these
models advertising expenditure has a marginal eect on a rm's demand that will correspond
to the marginal advertising cost it faces. Therefore a change of the cost function will likely
change advertising expenditure, and thus demand. It follows that in these models the taxation
of advertising has in general a clear eect on rm variables. More advertising increases compe-
tition and thus lowers prices. As demonstrated by Stahl (1989), in these models a subsidy for
advertising might be desirable.4 A model of this class is provided below.
In this article I show that both these eects, the informative and the persuasive eect of adver-
tising, are present in some industries to a varying degree. This variation may help to distinguish
dierent working mechanisms of advertising.5 In the theoretical part I show that many existing
theories of advertising are not consistent with the empirical observations. However, I create a
model by adding a persuasive element to an existing model of information that is consistent
with the observations. If both forces (persuasion and information) are present in a single model,
the eect of a cost reduction of advertising on consumer prices is not clear, and depends on
which eect dominates. This model can explain why an increase of the marginal cost of adver-
4Grossman and Shapiro (1984) argue however that in the case of dierentiated products advertising can lead
to an ination of the number of rms, which would not suggest the case for subsidy.
5Ackerberg (2001) argues that advertising that provides product information can be distinguished, as it
should only attract consumers that are inexperienced with the brand. This is however a dierent denition of
informational advertising as used in the mentioned model, which solely concerns price information.
4tising causes prices to increase in industries with more informative advertising, and to decrease
otherwise.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and empirical strategy used to
estimate the eects of a change in marginal advertising costs on advertising expenditures and
consumer prices, Section 3 presents the main empirical results, Section 4 shows that most
current models of advertising are not consistent with the presented observations, and develops
a model that is by combining the informative and persuasive views on advertising. Section 5
concludes.
2 Empirical strategy and data
The empirical investigation relies on a policy change of the tax on advertising in Austria in
2000. Austria is one of the few countries in the world, and the only OECD country that collects
a nationwide tax on advertising. The tax is ocially called `Werbeabgabe', and locally referred
to as `Werbesteuer'. It covers advertising for goods and services from all industries. A constant
fraction of advertising expenditure that a rm pays to the media has to be paid by the adver-
tising rm to the authorities as advertising tax. There are only few companies or publications
that are excused from paying the tax, such as advertising expenditure for content in student
run school magazines or the advertising of churches and benevolent non-prot organizations.
The tax includes all television and radio spots, advertisements in newspapers and magazines,
and expenditure for all other publicly displayed advertisements (for more details see Grohall et
al. 2007).
The advertising tax was introduced in 1927, and has remained in existence ever since without
interruption. Until the year 2000 it was collected at regional level with dierent tax systems
in dierent regions, whereby the location of the publication in which the advertising appears
determines the payable tax. The states Tirol and Burgenland6 did not collect any advertising
tax. The amount payable in the other provinces was typically ten percent of advertising ex-
penditure. In the state of Salzburg the tax was only collected in the city of Salzburg, and the
state Vorarlberg had a tax of only ve percent (see Bundesgesetzblatt 2000 and V  OZ (1995)).
At the national level, at which the large majority of rms operate and most advertisements are
made, the tax was ten percent.
After a change of the law, which took eect on June 1st 2000, the tax has been collected at
the national level, with an overall tax of 5 percent (WKO 2002) for national, regional and local
6Throughout I refer to the nine regional units of Austria as states. In other publications they may be referred
to as provinces or regions. I use the original German names of these States.
5advertisers alike. Hence the year 2000 brought about an increase of the advertising tax on
local advertisements from zero to ve percent for local advertisers in the states of Tirol and
Burgenland, while most of the other states and for nation-wide advertisers the tax rate dropped
from ten to ve percent. For a more detailed legal description of the tax before and after the
policy change see the legal description, Bundesgesetzblatt (2000). The map in Figure 1 shows
a map of Austria and highlights the tax changes. In the following empirical analysis I omit
the states Vorarlberg and Salzburg to get two sets of groups with the same treatment for each
element.
Two common sets of critiques of dierences-in-dierences estimates relate to possible endogene-
ity of selection of the treated group and the timing of the shock. First, since in the present case
the policy was of a unifying nature, the dierence between the treatment and control group
emerges from the prior decisions of Tirol and Burgenland not to install a tax on advertising.
This dierence, and thus the treatment group selection, dates back to the year 1927 when these
states considered the matter dierently from the rest of the country. Between the years 1927
and 2000, the First Republic under which the law was established was replaced with a home
made dictatorship, then under German rule, after which the country was occupied by the allies
after whose return the current Second Republic was installed. In addition the country experi-
enced the great depression, the Second World War, several changes of currency and membership
of the European Union. Hence there is reason to assume that the economic dierences that
inuenced the political process asymmetrically then, such as for example a more inuential
lobby of the media in some regions, are not present in the same way today.
Secondly it may be argued that the control and treatment group in the presented experiment
are not comparable, since they lived under dierent tax regimes prior to the policy change
and might have selected themselves into the more suitable one. There are several answers to
this: (a) the tax studied concerns a small fraction of rm expenditures, and the tax dierence
between Tirol and the other states itself concerns only a fraction of that fraction. Hence this
factor is probably a minor consideration for many rms facing their location decision; (b) in
the regressions concerning advertising expenditure the sample is restricted to businesses that
advertise in one state only. Since Austrian states are small (the median populated state Tirol
had less than 700,000 inhabitants in 2000) a regression that only involves local advertisers
concerns for the most part small local businesses whose location decision often goes back to
the birthplace of its founder; (c) I provide a robustness check of within rm reallocation of
advertising expenditures, which controls for rm dierences. In this specication the treatment
and control groups consist of the same rms, and thus do not allow for a selection bias. Further,
Austrian states are small in international comparison and less important policy makers than
states in other countries. For example, states do not collect income taxes and receive most of
6their budget and policies from the Austrian national government.
The timing of the policy would invalidate the estimation if it were chosen with considerations
that favor one of the two groups, or if it was anticipated. The report of the nance committee
of the Austrian parliament, which drafted the law and suggested the change, lists the following
reasons for its decision to harmonize the taxation of advertising across states (see Bundesge-
setzblatt 2000): They refer to the lengthy debate about the usefulness of such a tax in the
country, they list administrative complications for trans-state businesses due to the dierent
tax regimes, and call for a general harmonization of taxes to avoid tax competition (although
they do not see any signs of such a tax competition taking place, in fact there has been re-
markably little adjustment). The minutes of the discussion of the corresponding parliamentary
subgroup show that there was a less general, and quite particular cause for the timing of the
initiative: A decision of the constitutional court of Austria from the year 1998 ruled that each
local authority may only tax the advertising value generated on its territory, even in the case
of radio stations. As apparent from the minutes, this decision made the collection of the tax
practically impossible. In turn parliament felt that the law had to be adjusted. None of these
reasons suggests that the timing of the harmonization was chosen in a way that would benet
a particular state. Before the harmonization there was a recurring demand from the chamber
of commerce and some journalists to abolish the tax altogether, but no political party or rep-
resentative took the matter into their program. Thus there was no reason to anticipate the
harmonization for the year stated.
Another circumstance that would invalidate the natural experiment would be if Tirol and
Burgenland were simultaneously eected by an important other shock that drives or biases the
results. I check the archives of several national and international newspapers to see if Tirol
or Burgenland were mentioned signicantly more often in 2000 than in the other years of the
sample. This was not the case in the archives of the Economist, the New York Times (which has
been used in economic studies before to indicate importance of events, see Kuziemko, Werker
2006), the Wirtschaftsblatt, the only Austrian daily that is primarily interested in economic
matters, and Die Zeit, a German newspaper that reports frequently on Austrian events. Similar
tables for the control group states also do not show an unusual frequency of mentioning of either
state in the year 2000. Similarly, incomes were comparable between treatment and control
group: with a GDP per capita of 26,300 Euro, Tirol was the fourth richest state in Austria in
2000, a position it had in all prior years of the sample (ie. back to 1995), and much smaller
Burgenland was the poorest state.7 Estimations along the lines of equation 1 did not suggest
that any state experienced a break in its time trend of income in 2000.
The data on advertising expenditures comes from \FOCUS Research & Consulting Austria" (see
7Source of regional GDP data: Statistik Austria online database.
7Focus 2008). This company measures square centimeters and seconds of advertisements in TV
and radio stations as well as newspapers and magazines. Using the advertising price lists of these
publications, they can estimate the advertising expenditures of rms. The company supplied
me with their complete dataset from 1995 to 2005, which records advertising expenditure per
rm, year, medium and industry. Further they provided the area where the publication in
question is available, and an industry classication for the advertising company.
This dataset does not include all publications available in Austria, but with over 400 news
providers all major ones and a wide range of small local magazines. Table 1 reports by state
the number of regional advertisements recorded, the number of regional media (typically local
newspapers, here only shown if they are exclusive to one state), the log average cost of an
advertisement and the number of rms advertising in each of these mediums. In total, the
dataset contains about 700,000 advertisements for the period considered. Table 1 shows that in
terms of rms per medium and average advertising expenditures the values for the treatment
state Tirol do not dier widely from the other states. In terms of the number of advertisements
and regional media the treatment state Tirol is at the top of the distribution, together with
Steiermark. The relatively high number of regional media in Tirol in this sample is most likely
due to geographical reasons. Since Tirol shares only a small fraction of its border with other
Austrian states, other states have more trans-state advertisers. Burgenland has less rms per
publication, and comes last in terms of GDP per capita. I verify that qualitatively all the
results provided are robust to the exclusion of Burgenland from the sample.
One of the disadvantages of the data is that it contains little information on each of the adver-
tising rms and hence does not allow for the inclusion of many control variables. I could not
nd a useful data source with information on small Austrian rms that I could match. Further
the restrictions of the available data led me to analyze the eect on advertising expenditures
and consumer prices in separate datasets, and not a unied two stage regression. In its broad
collection of advertisements that include small local businesses from all kinds of industries
comparable over a long period of time, the FOCUS dataset is unique in Austria.
The analysis of consumer prices relies on two dierent datasets provided by the Austrian sta-
tistical oce (Statistik Austria). They provide price indexes for twelve dierent industries and
their subcategories, classied by the COICOP (Classication of Individual Consumption Ac-
cording to Purpose) system of classication from the UN, on a state level and over the period
from 1997 to 2003. The disadvantage of this classication is that it is not ne enough to dis-
tinguish individual products, and only informs about four digit product groups. Its advantage
is that it spans the complete universe of consumer products in Austria, and is perfectly com-
parable across states in dierent years. It is the nest aggregation of products for which the
Statistik Austria was willing to share its complete data. In addition, Statistik Austria provided
8me with a selection of 40 randomly selected individual products at the most detailed level in
dierent states in the same panel.
Figure 3 displays prices of goods for the main COICOP groups for Tirol and Burgenland and the
mean price for that good for the remaining six states in Austria, with Salzburg and Vorarlberg
omitted. There is no state-level variation in the prices for communication (COICOP two-digit
item 8), which does not vary at state level, as the national mail and the phone companies
all operate nation wide with the same prices. This category is excluded from the estimation.
Typically I estimate a dierences-in-dierences equation of the following type:
yit = Postt1 + Treati2 + Postt  Treati  3 + it: (1)
In this equation, Post is a variable that takes a value of one for the year of 2003 and a value
of zero in the year 1997, Treat is a dummy variable that indicates the rms advertising in
the states of Tirol and Burgenland, and the interaction Post  Treat gives the dierences-in-
dierences coecient of interest. In the regressions robust standard errors are clustered by
state. Although the used data is a panel with many time dimensions, I typically focus on the
year three years before and the year three years after the treatment (the years 1997 and 2003)
to avoid correlation of errors in the regression, which is a concern in dierences-in-dierences
estimations with repeated time periods (see Bertrand et al. (2004)). Some robustness checks
with more complete panels and other years are provided.
3 Results
Eect on advertising expenditures
First I analyze how the growth rate of advertising expenditures reacted to the introduction of
the tax. Given that the treatment diers at state level, I only use local advertisers, dened
as rms that advertise in one state only. Since most advertising in Austria is at the national
level or across more than one state, this restriction reduces the number of observations in the
dataset to less than ten percent. In addition I only use rms that have positive advertising
expenditures in all eleven years of the panel from 1995 to 2005 to obtain a balanced panel.
The resulting dataset consists of 877 observations in the provinces of Tirol and Burgenland and
1,120 in the other provinces, and includes a complete panel of total advertising expenditure
for each of these rms and each year. The data reports the expenditures as they arrive at the
publications, and thus reports the expenditure net of taxes.
In order to normalize advertising expenditures I compute the growth rates of advertising ex-
9penditure for each of the remaining rms. Figure 2 shows the mean growth rates of advertising
expenditure for the two subsamples of Tirol and Burgenland where the tax increased and other
states where the tax decreased, and the 95 percent condence intervals of these mean growth
rates. These are estimated using information on the coecents from a regression of advertis-
ing expenditure on year xed eects using robust standard errors clustered by industry. To
limit the inuence of outliers, the one percent highest and lowest growth are excluded from the
graph.
Figure 2 shows a higher growth rate of advertising expenditures outside of Tirol and Burgenland
in the year 2000, which is the year in which the tax was implemented. In all other years the
mean growth rates of advertising expenditures are not signicantly dierent at ve percent level
of signicance. Table 2 provides p-values from a two sided test of the equality of these growth
rates. As in the graph, the test only suggests a dierence in the year 2000 with a p-value of
0.03 in the two sided test, while in all other years the p-values of a simple test of dierences of
means are above 0.05 and also above 0.1. The jump of growth rate in 2000 is the largest change
of growth rate visible in the graph, the second biggest does not reach half its magnitude. These
results provide evidence that the change in advertising costs led to an immediate strong increase
of advertising expenditures in the states where advertising became less costly on average.
As a placebo test to this simple dierence of means, I replace the treatment state with each of
the other six states of Austria (absent Salzburg and Vorarlberg), and rerun the exercise for all
these eight states and nine years, omitting in addition Tirol and Burgenland. These p-values
from a test for the dierence of means are reported in the right panel of Table 2. In the placebo
table there is no dierence signicance at one percent level, and two that are signicant at
ve percent level. Forty p-values from random data are expected to deliver two values below
0.05.
Figure 2 suggests that the dierence of growth rates of advertising expenditures as received by
the media between states is 25 percent. This dierence is the largest mean dierence between
the two groups observed in all the data. If rm expenditures are estimated this dierence
is less, since those rms that increased their expenditures also had to pay fewer taxes. If
the 9.5 percent8 tax dierence is accounted for, a 9.5 percent cost dierence resulted in a
15.5 percent dierence of advertising expenditures. Thus on average the estimates suggest
that a one percent increase of advertising costs results in a 1.6 percent reduction of advertising
expenditure, conditional on rms not exiting from the advertising markets. This is the estimate
of the elasticity of advertising expenditures with respect to marginal advertising costs.
One concern is that despite the selection of surviving rms only in the previous exercise, they
8Tirol and Burgenland experienced a ve percent increase of costs from one to 1.05, and the other states a
decrease of 4.5 percent from 1.1 to 1.05.
10might be aected dierently by the unequal exit of other rms. Exit from advertising is an
extreme form of advertising reduction. However, the presented results are robust qualitatively
and quantitatively when the sample is restricted to those industries in which I do not nd
signicant evidence for increased exit of rms. Again the only signicant dierence of mean
growth rates is observed in the year 2000, and in this reduced panel it is 26 percent. The table
that indicates the exit probabilities across industries is available on request.
To see how the eect diers across industries I provide estimates from a dierences-in-dierences
regression as described in equation 1 in the upper part of Table 3. I focus on one year three
years before and the one three years after the treatment (the years 1997 and 2003), which
is the most conservative strategy to address the problem of auto-correlation of errors in the
regression (see Bertrand et al. 2004). I use only rms that are present with positive advertising
expenditure in both these years. Further I use only advertisers that advertise in a single state
in order to compare small local rms. The industry classication is taken from the advertising
expenditure dataset and similar to the one constructed by its supplier. I only provide results
for industries with at least 30 overall observations. I include state xed eects in all regressions.
There is evidence for a signicant reduction of advertising expenditures in Tirol and Burgenland
for some industries. All coecients that dier signicantly from zero at a ten percent level of
signicance show a negative coecient in the interaction of post and treat, and also the overall
mean eect is negative and signicantly dierent from zero.
Additional evidence comes from the analysis of within rm reallocation. For this exercise I
again observe only rms that have positive advertising expenditures in both the years 1997
and 2003 in Tirol or Burgenland and at least one other state. For each rm I aggregate all
advertising in states outside Tirol and Burgenland. Thus for the regression there remains a
sample with four advertising expenditure observations per rm (within and outside of Tirol in
the years 1997 and 2003). This estimation strategy can provide robustness with respect to a
possible selection eect, since in this specication the treatment and the control group consist
of dierent advertising expenditures of the same rms. In addition, this estimation provides
typically more observations since most of the rms in Austria advertise in more than one state.
Using this sample I estimate in OLS a dierences-in-dierences regression using again robust
standard errors, and in this exercise rm xed eects. The results are reported in the second
part of Table 3. There is stronger evidence for a reduction of advertising expenditures in Tirol
within rms overall, and for all industries except tourism, coecients do not vary strongly
across industries. In this part of the panel I can not cluster standard errors by state, since I
pool dierent states for each remaining rm.
In addition I verify if these expenditures correlate with advertising intensity of industries, but
nd no evidence for such a correlation. A related question is if the relative number of newspapers
11declined with the advertising tax. The answer is that the number of publications remained very
stable in treatment and control states alike, and I did not nd any evidence for a dierential
eect. All these results are available on request.
Taken together, these results suggest that the increase of advertising costs indeed caused a
decrease of advertising expenditures across almost all industries, and to the opposite eect in
no industry. Many of the views on advertising described in the literature section of this article
would not predict such an adjustment of expenditures. The within-rm results give similar
coecients for dierent industries, and suggest that the reallocation is of similar magnitude in
dierent industries.
Prices
In the literature there exists some evidence of how advertising eects prices. In particular,
several studies make use of bans of advertising in certain areas for particular goods. They
found that advertising seems to decrease prices for eyeglasses (Kwoka 1984), children's breakfast
cereal (Clark 2007), and drugs (Cody 1976), among others. Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) present
evidence that advertising decreases the price of advertised goods in liquor stores, while it
increases the price of non advertised goods in the same stores. On the other hand, Gallet
and Euzenet (2002) suggest that advertising to sales ratios have a positive eect on the supply
price in the brewing industry.9
Again the estimation follows the common dierences-in-dierences approach, following equation
1. To avoid autocorrelation in the errors I use one observation per time period and unit, the
mean price for each state and industry for the years 1997 to 1999 for the pre-treatment eect,
and the mean for 2001 to 2003 for the post-treatment measure. Table 4 reports the estimates
for all COICOP class 1 industries, except communication which does not vary at state level.
To increase the number of observations I use the most disaggregated level for which I can
access price information (typically this is on COICOP class 3 level), so that sub categories for
industries are used. In these regressions I apply state xed eects and cluster robust standard
errors by state. This table conrms what is observable in graph 3: There is evidence that prices
increased in the industries food and education, while they decreased for alcohol and tobacco,
transport, hotels and restaurants.
The overall eect is estimated in Table 5. Again these estimates suggest an increase of prices in
Tirol and Burgenland, however with a possible delay. The dierential coecient is positive, but
not signicant when the years 1999-2001 are compared. It remains at a similar magnitude for
the years 1999-2002, 1999-2003 and 1999-2004, but increases in signicance. Columns six and
seven provide two placebo estimates for the periods before and after the treatment (1995-1997
9In a related earlier study Gisser (1999) found no signicant relationship in the same industry.
12and 2003-2005) and show no dierential treatment eect.
The dierential treatment eect that I study appears strictly at regional level. Advertising
at the national level experienced a reduction of the tax on advertising from 10 to 5 percent.
This reduction however is similar for national advertisers in the treatment and control states.
The treatment is thus stronger in industries in which the share of local advertising is higher,
and price eects can be expected to be larger as well. I compute the share of local advertising
for each industry from the Focus data, and plot it against the marginal price eects in gure
5. The left panel shows the absolute value of the dierential coecients from table 4, and
the right panel shows COICOP category 2 prices for which I found matching industries in the
Focus data. See Appendix 2 for details on the match. In both panels there is a strong positive
correlation between the share of local advertisers, and the price response.
One concern is that the prices at industry level, which are aggregations, may be too broad to
cover the true eects. Statistics Austria generally does not give access to its data on prices
of individual goods, but they agreed to provide me with a small random sample to perform
a robustness check. I asked for prices are that are comparable across states, from products
that may be sold by small local businesses. They provided me with 40 such prices at the most
disaggregated available level. Examples of these units are beefsteak in a restaurant, an hour of
a car mechanic or a car wash. Some of these panel series are incomplete, with missing states
or missing years. I drop these products, and in table 6 I reproduce the same regressions as
on industry level using these detailed prices. As is apparent, the tables give the same signs
as prices at industry level on the dierential eect. However, the number of observations is
lower, which sometimes may be the reason for lower statistical signicance. This robustness
check gives some evidence that the aggregate price indices behave similar to the goods that
they consist of in this exercise.
Persuasive and informative advertising industries
The observed dierences of the behavior of consumer prices across industries points to possible
dierences of the parameters across industries. Consumers may be more easily persuaded to buy
certain products such as alcohol and tobacco than to buy certain food. In an industry in which
persuasion is not easy, advertising content focuses on the informative aspect of advertising,
while industries with persuasive potential will make eorts to put additional elements into
their advertisings.
As discussed in the introduction and as illustrated in the model section below, the model pre-
dicts a positive relationship between industries in which advertising leads to a price increase,
and the persuasive content of advertising. To test this prediction I rely on a study from the
marketing literature that provides a meta-analysis of the information intensity in advertisings
13from dierent industries (Abernethy and Franke 1996, Table 2). In their article they summa-
rize the ndings from 60 studies that measure information content of advertising. Using the
methodology developed by Resnik and Stern (1977), which relies on the count of well dened
information cues, they give estimates of the information share across industries. I merge their
industry with the COICOP industries from the Statistic Austria as far as this was possible
with condence (see Appendix 2). Graph 4 shows a clear positive correlation between the price
response to advertising suggested by my estimates in Table 4 and the information content re-
ported by this meta-study. The correlation between the two series is 74 percent, a regression
with robust standard errors yields a slope that is signicantly dierent from zero at ve percent
level of condence. The slope coecient of the displayed line is 0.02 with a robust standard
error of 0.0077. This suggests that the informative eect of advertising is observed in industries
with high information content in advertising.
Summary and magnitudes
These results show a signicant relative reduction of advertising expenditures or a more frequent
exit from advertising markets in the states of Tirol and Burgenland after they experienced a
relative increase of the overall advertising tax and for the large majority of industries. Further,
the results highlight a within-rm reallocation of advertising expenditure out of Tirol. While
the advertising expenditures react consistently across industries, consumer prices increase for
some and decrease for other industries. In particular, there is evidence that prices increased in
the industries food, transportation, education and tourism while they decrease for alcohol and
tobacco, health, leisure and house and garden.
To nd the magnitude of the overall price change, I use the weights for each of the COICOP
one digit groups provided by Statistics Austria (2010). The weighted dierential growth rates
from Table 4 suggest that mean prices in Tirol were about 1 percent higher than in the other
states after the introduction of the tax. This suggests that the 9.5 percent dierence in marginal
advertising costs, or the 25.5 percent dierence of advertising expenditures arriving at media, or
the 16 percent dierence of rm expenditures on advertising resulted in a one percent dierence
of consumer prices. Note that this mean price is an average of positive and negative growth
rates. The eects for certain industries or products can be much higher or lower as apparent
from Table 4.
4 Implications for theory
Many existing models of advertising are not consistent with these ndings. In this section I
will review some of these before modifying an existing model to arrive at a new model that is
14consistent with the empirical results.
In the literature there is a class of models of advertising based on the view that advertising
expenditure itself may serve as a quality signal. This idea was developed by Nelson (1970, 1974,
1978) and later formalized by Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
In these models advertising expenditure can serve as a costly signal for quality that can lead
to a separating equilibrium of high and low quality rms. By this account, the content or form
of advertising is irrelevant. Milgrom and Roberts write: \this type of advertising corresponds
to a public burning of money". This type of model is in contradiction one of the key ndings
of this paper, the nding that marginal advertising costs inuence advertising expenditure. If
advertising is equal to public burning of money, the optimal amount of advertising expenditure
would remain the same if as a consequence of a tax part of the money is submitted to the
government rather than to the ames. This holds true as long as the public is aware of that
tax.
Similarly, to view advertising as a prisoner dilemma, or a Bertrand game sketched in the
introduction, does not predict that advertising expenditures of rms react with the marginal
cost of advertising. By this view, the rm that advertises an amount  more than its competitors
captures all or a large share of the consumers. In this model, rms invest in advertising to the
limit of their resources. A tax on advertising that aects all rms in the same way does again
not change the total advertising expenditure of rms. Hence in this model, like in the quality-
signal model, a taxation of advertising generates public revenue without hurting the rms or
the consumers.
Schmalensee (1974) derives equilibria in a Cournot model in which advertising serves as an entry
barrier (see also Bain 1968 or Cubbin 1981 for papers that consider advertising as entry barrier).
This model, which has surprisingly complex and counterintuitive predictions, distinguishes
several cases such that a change of the marginal advertising costs may increase or decrease
advertising expenditures, and increase or decrease market prices. Thus it is not possible to say
anything on the consistency of the presented data with this model, as Schmalensee provides
no prediction of advertising expenditures and prices that can be estimated with the data at
hand.
The information models of informative advertising (see for example Stahl 1994) typically predict
that advertising expenditure decreases with the marginal cost of advertising. However, since
they only consider the informative aspect of advertising, they predict that advertising lowers
consumer prices. Thus the models can not predict the nding that advertising increases in
some industries with low information content in advertising. In these models, a subsidy for
advertising would increase welfare.
15As shown below, if I extend such a model by a persuasive element I arrive at a model that
has both eects, the informative and the persuasive eect of advertising, which is consistent
with all the ndings from the data. The extension of an informative model with persuasion
also addresses another important aspect of these models. In these models advertising solely
serves to inform consumers of market prices. In practice however advertising contains much
more than just price information. If a persuasive element is added to the model, this criticism
is also addressed.10
Consider a market with n  2 rms that produce a good that for the same level of advertising
is a perfect substitute with production costs equal to zero. Firms compete by simultaneously
choosing prices pi and advertising expenditures ai for rm i, taking the behavior from the
other rms as given. The measure of advertising expenditure ai denotes the probability that
a given consumer will receive an advertisement of rm i. Therefore by denition 0  ai  1.
Firms do not know how many advertisements from competitors reach a consumer, thus each
consumer has the same probability to receive an advertisement from rm i. The costs of
advertising level ai are given by the cost function c(ai), which is assumed to be positive for all
values ai > 0 and monotonically increasing in ai. Further I assume that lima!0 c0(a) = 0 and
lima!1 c0(a) = 1 to ensure uniqueness. This assumption plausibly requires that it is nearly
costless to inform a very small number of consumers, but very costly to reach every single
consumer with advertising.
On the demand side of the market, there is a mass of consumers who wish to purchase one unit
of the good at most. The mass of consumers is normalized to one without loss of generality.
Consumers receive advertisements which indicate the price at which the advertising rm sells
the product. A consumer who does not receive an advertisement does not buy the product,
consumers who receive more or equal to one advertisement buy at the lowest price they observe,
given this price is below their marginal willingness to pay. This is the information component
of advertising as developed by Butters (1977).
To introduce the persuasive element of advertising I built upon the work of Stigler and Becker
(1977) who propose to model persuasive advertising by making a distinction between the price
as rms see it and the price as it appears to households.11 If rm i charges price pi for the good
and advertises with advertising intensity ai, consumers will respond to this price subjectively
as if it was i = pi=g(ai), where i is the subjective price as it appears to the household in
question and g(ai) is a monotonically increasing function of the advertising intensity of rm i.
The function g(a) maps non-negative advertising expenditures into linear transformations of
10For empirical evidence on the amount of information in advertising see Anderson and Renault (2006),
Abernethy and Butler (1992), Abernethy and Franke (1996).
11Among others, Becker and Murphy (1993) argue that persuasive advertising may serve to shift demand.
16prices. Further I assume that the rst derivative g0(a) is strictly greater than zero, such that an
increase of advertising expenditure makes the subjective price appear smaller to the persuaded
consumers. Thus advertising makes consumers more willing to buy the product at a certain
price.
It should be noted that in the model derived such an increase of g(ai) can be interpreted as
a higher willingness to pay for the good by a given number of consumers, but also such that
the number of potential consumers increases with an increase of ai. In these models both these
views are possible, since in practice a higher level of advertising for a given price leads to an
increased demand for the advertised good.
The maximum willingness to pay for each consumer is assumed to be equal to a subjective
price of v. If consumers receives no advertisement, or only advertisements suggesting prices
 > v they do not buy the product. If they receive at least one advertisement that suggests a
subjective price  smaller or equal to v they buy from the rm with the lowest price.
A similar envelope theorem argument as developed by Stahl (1994) can be applied in the present
case to show that in the situation analyzed in equilibrium, the optimal advertising expenditure
of a rm will be independent of the consumer price it charges.12 The convexity assumptions
concerning costs ensure that for a rm a unique optimal level of advertising expenditure exists.13
This level is similar for all other rms, since they are ex ante identical. I will denote the constant
equilibrium advertising expenditure of rms by a. Apart from this ex-ante proposition on
the constancy of advertising expenditures, it can be veried ex post that rms do not have
an incentive to change their advertising levels if all the other rms advertise the amount a.
Equilibrium prots in equation 4 denote the prots for a rm given that all its rivals use
advertising amount a and prices from the equilibrium distribution. Since this equation is
independent of prices, this equation is maximized with respect to ai by rm i, and hence rm
i will also choose the equilibrium level a of advertising. The equilibrium price distribution
is denoted with F(p) which indicates the probability that a rm charges a price lower than
p.
The number of goods that rm i can expect to sell is in the case of two rms given by the demand
function Di = ai[1   a + a(1   F(pi))], in Nash equilibrium it must hold that ai = a (provided
a unique solution for a exists). The terms of this demand function count the consumers that
receive advertising from rm i (by denition this is equal to ai) and not from the rival (1   a)
plus those consumers that receive advertising from both rms, provided that the price of rm
12In particular, if the prot function is expressed in terms of  instead of p, its form is a special case of the
general form analyzed by Stahl. Some empirical evidence on this nding was presented by Caves and Greene
(1999) who found that advertising does not serve as an indicator of quality.
13Note from equation 2 that maximization with respect to ai gives the equilibrium condition that marginal
costs of advertising equal a constant.
17i is lower. In the case of n rms this demand can be generalized and is characterized by the
polynomial Di = ai[1 aF(pi)]n 1. Then expected prots of rm i, denoted by E(i) are given
by:
E[i(pi;ai)] = aiE([1   aF(pi)]
n 1)pi   c(ai) (2)
At any point of the equilibrium price distribution of consumer prices the expected prots must
be the same. In equilibrium the upper bound of the price distribution is the marginal willingness
of consumers to pay vg(a) (see Varian 1980). The price distribution must be continuous since
any breakpoint could be protably undercut. At a price at the upper bound of the distribution
the probability of another price being lower F(p) must be one. Expected equilibrium prots at
this point can be derived straight forwardly and are given in equation 4.
The equilibrium price distribution F(p) is then derived from equating the prot function of
the upper bound with expected prots. Equating prots at the upper bound of the price
distribution with expected prots while setting F(pi) = 0 (since at the lower bound prices can't
be undercut) yields the lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution. Thus the equilibrium
price distribution is given by:
F(p) =
8
> > > <
> > > :











if (1   a)n 1vg(a) < p < vg(a)
0 if p  (1   a)n 1vg(a)
(3)
The expected equilibrium prots of each rm are:
E(i) = E(ai(1   a)
n 1vg(ai)   c(ai)); (4)
Given symmetry, in equilibrium it holds that ai = a. The main dierence with respect to the
model of Butters (1977) and Stahl (1994) (apart from the explicit functional form on demand
I assume) is the introduction of the persuasive element vg(a). Thus also the results so far
are largely similar; without the inclusion of the persuasive element the equation would be the
same. Equilibrium advertising expenditures as derived in equation 4 are indeed independent of





1   (1   a)
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18Consider the introduction of an advertising tax which transforms the cost function of rms from
c(a) to c(at)(1+t), where at denotes advertising expenditures under taxation. The advertising
tax considered in the empirical analysis in this paper works in a similar fashion, since it is
calculated as a constant share of all advertising expenditure of a rm.
 Proposition 1: In equilibrium @a=@t < 0. The introduction of a proportional tax on
advertising expenditure decreases advertising expenditure. See appendix 1 for a proof.
Proposition 1 holds in the extended model that includes the persuasive g(a) term, but it is
also observed in previous models which do not incorporate a persuasive element. A dierence
between these models emerges however when prices are considered:
 Proposition 2: In equilibrium @p=@a may be positive or negative depending on the param-
eters and the location on the price distribution. Advertising will increase market prices in
industries where persuasive forces dominate, and decrease them where informative forces
dominate. While the upper end of the price distribution increases with an increase of
the equilibrium advertising expenditure a, the lower end of the price distribution and the
expected value of prices may increase or decrease.
Proof: First consider the model that does not have the persuasive element represented by the
















Since in this model v is the maximum willingness to pay and hence the maximum observed
consumer price, it will hold that p  v. The derivative above must be greater or equal to
zero. F(p) denotes the probability to observe a price lower than p, hence if F(p) increases for
a given value of p, this suggests a decrease of prices. Higher advertising expenditure increases
competition and thus decreases prices in this purely informational model. In the model extended






















n 1 is greater or equal to one since p  v(g(a)), the term [1   a(1  
a)g0(a)=[(n 1)g(a)]] is smaller than one since all the components of its second term are positive.
Note that at the upper bound of the price distribution where p = vg(a) this partial derivative
19is negative. Hence the upper bound of the price distribution increases with higher advertising
expenditures for all parameters of the model. This is due to the persuasive element that
increases the maximum willingness of consumers to pay with advertising.
Prices at the lower bound of the price distribution where p = (1   a)n 1vg(a) will increase if
(n   1)g(a) < g0(a)(1   a), and decrease or remain the same otherwise. Hence at the lower
bound prices are more likely to decrease for a large number of rms n, or a small opportunity
to persuade consumers (small g0(a)). In these markets the price distribution widens with ad-
vertising. An example of a price distribution in this case is demonstrated in gure 6, which
shows price distributions for simulated data with varying equilibrium advertising expenditures.
Markets are parametrically possible where all prices increase (in the sense that the values on
the cumulative density function of prices becomes less or equal at all feasible prices).
From equation 5 follows that the expected value of prices will increase in the equilibrium
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+ (n   2)(1   a)
n 3

> 1   (1   a)
n 2: (6)
For a level of advertising expenditure close to zero this inequality will not hold, and an increase
of advertising expenditure will decrease the expected value of prices. Note that even in the case
of a large number of rms the expected value of prices may increase or decrease; given a large
number of rms it will increase if
a(1   a)g
0(a) > g(a): (7)
This suggests that in markets with a large number of competitors and either very low or very
high initial equilibrium levels of advertising, an increase of advertising expenditures decreases
consumer prices. At intermediate levels of advertising the g(a) function determines if prices
increase or decrease with advertising expenditures. If persuasion is strongly possible (repre-
sented by a large g0(a)=g(a)) prices are likely to increase with advertising expenditures. This
provides another testable implication: Industries with a large ratio of g0(a)=g(a) are expected
to have more persuasive elements in their advertising (since industries in which persuasion does
not work focus on information), and also to have a stronger positive reaction of prices. Below
I will show that such a relationship indeed exists in the data.
Given that this model uses changing preferences, it is not straight forward to analyze welfare
generally. Prots decrease in equilibrium with an increase of equilibrium advertising, which
follows straight forwardly from the rst derivative of equation 4 in combination with Appendix
201.
This model provides a unied framework to study both forces of advertising (information and
persuasion) simultaneously at work. It is consistent with the empirical ndings in four re-
spects. (1) An increase of the marginal costs of advertising leads to a decrease of advertising
expenditures. (2) Consumer prices may increase or decrease with advertising. (3) Industries
where consumer prices increase with advertising are industries in which advertising has a large
persuasive function, and (4) it has an informative function otherwise. This suggests that the
information content of advertising should be correlated with the marginal price reaction, as
shown in the previous section.
5 Conclusion
A policy which involved a change of the taxation of advertising is used to estimate across
industries how advertising costs aect advertising expenditure and consumer prices. The data
suggests that the proportional taxation of advertising expenditure is an eective policy to reduce
advertising; I estimate that a one percent increase of the marginal tax of advertising decreases
advertising expenditure by 1.6 percent, and there is signicant evidence of reduction across all
industries.
On the basis of a theoretical model I show that in principle prices may increase or decrease with
advertising, depending on whether persuasive or informative forces dominate in an industry.
The estimation results suggest that informative forces, which decrease prices with advertising,
dominate in the industries food and education; while persuasive forces that increase consumer
prices with advertising seem to dominate in the industries of alcohol and tobacco, transporta-
tion, hotels and restaurants.
Thus there is a case to restrict advertising in these latter industries { and in fact many coun-
tries already restrict advertisements for alcohol and tobacco. As shown, a proportional tax on
advertising expenditure is a useful policy tool to achieve that goal. Overall however, the infor-
mative forces seem to dominate. I estimate that a ten percent increase of advertising tax leads
to a 0.5 percent increase across consumer prices. Thus a complete abolition of the ve percent
advertising tax in Austria would lead to an overall increase in competition and lower consumer
prices by about 0.25 percentage points. This eect however would dier across industries as
described.
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25Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
For a single rm it is straight forward to show that given the advertising expenditures of its
competitors an increase of advertising costs decreases its advertising expenditures. This is less
trivial for the equilibrium a in Nash equilibrium. Note rst that if a solution to the optimal
amount of advertising exists, it can't be the boundary solution of a = 1, since from equation
4 all rms would make losses at this level of a. Thus if an equilibrium solution with a > 0
exists, it must be an interior solution, and fulll the following rst and second order equilibrium
conditions:








The term (1 + t) on the right hand side denotes the tax on advertising. Let us consider the




= (1 + t):
Before the introduction of the tax, the numerator and denominator on the left hand side have
the same value. Proposition 1 states that a decrease of a would increase the left hand side to
make the equation hold in the new equilibrium for an increased right hand side. To show is that
in equilibrium the partial derivative of the left hand side of the equation above with respect to
a is smaller than zero. This condition to be proven is:
[v(1   at)n 1(atg(at))0]
0 c0(a)   v(1   at)n 1(atg(at))0c00(a)
(c0(a))2 < 0
From the rst order condition, and given that we analyze the case where t is shifted from 0 to
 close to zero, follows that c0(a) = v(1   at)n 1(atg(at))0 in the neighborhood of t = 0. This
simplies the condition above to:
(1   a)
n 1(ag(a))




26The term (1 a)n 1(ag(a))00v must be smaller or equal to c00(a) by the second order condition.
The term  (n   1)(1   a)n 2(ag(a))0v is less than zero since all its components are positive.
Thus the equation above must hold for all feasible equilibria, the left hand side decreases in
a, thus a decrease in a is needed to balance the increase of taxes on the right hand side, and
hence an increase of the marginal costs of advertising decreases the equilibrium advertising
expenditure.
Appendix 2
In this appendix I provide details of how I link the industries in the COICOP classication
from the Statistics Austria with the industries from Abernethy and Franke (1996) (from here
on abbreviated as AF), Table 2 on page 10. Since the AF industries do not follow a standard
classication, I have to link them based on the name. COICOP subgroup levels are matched
with the most tting industry. Then I compute for each industry a weighted mean of information
values, the weights were taken from the price index baskets provided by Statistics Austria
(2010). The categories of food and alcohol and tobacco are omitted in this match, since they yield
opposite price predictions, but are inseparably pooled in AF. For the table the estimates from
the 1997-2003 dierences-in-dierences estimates were compared with the percent informative
measures provided by AF in Table 2 on page 10.
The COICOP subgroups were merged as follows (the following paragraph shows in bold the
main COICOP industry, in italics the COICOP two digit sub-industry, then in unformat-
ted text the matched AF industry): Health: Medical products and equipment: Medicine,
medical products; Out-patient services: Services; Hospital services: Personal care; Clothing:
Clothing: Clothing; Footwear: Clothing; Hotels, Restaurants: Catering services: Financial,
transportation, travel; Accommodation services: Financial, transportation, travel; Transport:
Purchase of vehicles: Cars, Operation of personal transport equipment: Financial, transporta-
tion, travel, Transport services: Financial, transportation, travel; House, water, electr., gas:
Actual rentals for housing: Laundry and household; Maintenance and repair of the dwelling:
Laundry and household; Water supply and miscellaneous services: Services; Electricity, gas,
and other fuels: Laundry and household; Durable goods: Furniture and furnishing, car-
pets, oor coverings: Furniture, home furnishes, appliances; Household textiles: Household,
lawn, garden; Household appliances: Electronics; Glassware, tableware, and household utensils:
Household, lawn, garden; Tools and equipment for house and garden: Furniture, home furnishes,
appliances; Goods and services for routine household maintenance: Services Recreation, cul-
ture: Audi visual processing equipment: Hobbies, toy, transportation; Other major durables:
Hobbies, toy, transportation; Other recreational items and equipment: Hobbies, toy, trans-
27portation; Recreation and cultural services: Services; Newspapers books and stationary: Toys,
leisure, entertainment; Package holidays: Services; Miscellaneous: Personal care; Personal
care; Personal eects; Hobbies, toy, transportation; Social protection; Institutional; Insurance;
Financial, transportation, travel; Financial services; Financial, transportation, travel; Other
services; Services Food Food.
The match for gure 4 was done as follows (COICOP 2 for price data in italics followed by
normal text for the advertising data): Gas and fuel, fuel; medical products, pharmaceutical
and cosmetic products; shoes (including repair), shoes; food, food; hotel services, hotels; leisure
and culture, touristic; household appliances, electronic appliances; water supply, water supply;
transportation, transportation; alcohol, alcohol; furniture, furniture (trade); tools for house and
garden, garden tools; fotography, optic trade; transportation services, services.
28Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Area Population GDP/cap. Number of Number of Log mean Number of rms
km2 2008 (in 1;000) 2007 advertisements publications expenditure per publication
Burgenland 3,965 282 21,600 12,925 12 12.06 140.5
K arnten 9,536 561 27,800 30,467 15 12.4 275.4
Nieder osterreich 19,178 1,601 26,600 34,678 19 12.54 250.3
Ober osterreich 11,982 1,409 31,800 47,737 14 12.94 399.5
Salzburg 7,154 528 37,300 38,540 15 12.57 305.3
Steiermark 16,392 1,206 28,200 42,881 22 13.12 251.1
Tirol 12,648 702 34,200 58,501 22 12.36 298.4
Vorarlberg 2,601 367 34,000 24,886 11 12.58 270.2
Wien 415 1,680 43,300 27,049 18 13.49 186.9
Note: Summary statistics for the nine states of Austria. The last four columns consider only regional advertisements, dened as
those that are published in publications that appear in only one state. The last four columns show numbers for the full panel from
1995-2005.
2
9Figure 1: This map shows the heterogeneous changes of advertising taxes in Austria in 2000. In
most parts of the country the tax was reduced from ten to ve percent. In Tirol and Burgenland
it went in the other direction, from zero to ve percent. Vorarlberg and Salzburg had mixed
tax regimes in state subdivisions.
30Figure 2: Growth rates of advertising expenditures for regional Austrian advertising rms with
positive advertising expenditures in all the years from 1997 to 2005. For the computation of
the displayed 95 percent condence intervals, advertising expenditure are regressed on time
xed eects. The one percent highest and lowest growth rates are excluded. Salzburg and
Vorarlberg are excluded, Tirol and Burgenland experienced a tax increase, while the other
states experienced a tax decrease. Robust standard errors are clustered by industry.
31Table 2: Dierences of advertising expenditure growth rates
Tirol+Burgenland K arnten Nieder o. Ober o. Steiermark Wien
tu   td p p p p p p
1997 0.13 0.349 0.683 0.798 0.231 0.871 0.157
1998 0.10 0.422 0.167 0.083 0.882 0.358 0.912
1999 -0.004 0.978 0.574 0.033 0.723 0.099 0.847
2000 0.25 0.033 0.469 0.294 0.74 0.761 0.744
2001 -0.19 0.123 0.066 0.525 0.036 0.2 0.25
2002 0.01 0.941 0.219 0.527 0.53 0.315 0.634
2003 -0.001 0.993 0.543 0.484 0.739 0.315 0.937
2004 0.14 0.228 0.07 0.211 0.643 0.545 0.786
Note: The left part of this table provides results of tests for dierences of mean growth rates of advertising expenditures between
states with increasing and decreasing marginal tax rates for advertising (tu td) and the p-value from a two-sided test of the dierence
of the coecients. The right side of the table provides the p-values of corresponding placebo exercises with each state of the sample
with tax decreases tested against the others. The states Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted from all calculations.
3
2Table 3: Dierences in dierences of advertising expenditures across industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Audio Construction Services Leisure Retail Trade House Garden Automotive Clothing Tourism
Advertising expenditures: Dierences between local advertisers
Post 0.0778 -0.105 0.296 -0.0160 0.0536 -0.114 0.0958 0.343** -0.352 -0.110
(0.0971) (0.167) (0.327) (0.200) (0.654) (0.557) (0.0974) (0.132) (0.223) (0.228)
Post x Treat -0.307** -0.283 -0.860* -0.170 0.0245 -0.494 -0.270** -0.287* -0.372 0.184
(0.0966) (0.167) (0.327) (0.200) (0.654) (0.557) (0.0974) (0.132) (0.223) (0.228)
Constant 13.14*** 13.00*** 12.86*** 13.12*** 12.60*** 14.04*** 13.00*** 12.60*** 13.30*** 12.99***
(0.202) (0.125) (0.0663) (0.341) (1.059) (0.803) (0.306) (0.122) (0.503) (0.351)
State xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1064 56 101 123 30 43 114 326 113 85
With tax increase 428 23 48 44 22 21 52 100 51 40
Advertising expenditures: Within rm reallocation
Post 0.117*** 0.178*** 0.109*** 0.157*** 0.072 0.061 0.127*** 0.129** 0.022 0.040
(0.106) (0.412) (0.346) (0.246) (0.525) (0.398) (0.270) (0.531) (0.350) (0.496)
Post x Treat -0.191*** -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.224*** -0.206*** -0.199*** -0.209*** -0.207*** -0.136*** -0.830
(0.011) (0.045) (0.034) (0.027) (0.050) (0.037) (0.024) (0.044) (0.035) (0.626)
Constant 14.40*** 14.31*** 14.29*** 14.31*** 15.65*** 14.40*** 15.21*** 14.41*** 14.49*** 13.88***
(0.813) (0.261) (0.215) (0.178) (0.350) (0.263) (0.181) (0.439) (0.265) (0.215)
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,048 64 124 174 56 88 108 28 68 40
Note: Both parts of the table report di-in-di estimates of advertising expenditures for the years 1997 and 2003. The rst panel
considers local advertisers; the second panel considers within rm reallocations for cross-state advertisers. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, in the upper panel they are clustered by state. Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted from all calculations.
3
3Figure 3: Prices
Note: State price index for states with increasing and decreasing marginal costs for advertising.
All COICOP 2 categories listed, except for the prices of Mail and Telecommunications, which
do not vary at state level. The states Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted from the gure.
34Table 4: Prices, main industry groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Food Alc Tob Garment Housing Furnishing Health Transport Recreation Education Hotels Other
Post 0.0203** 0.0656*** 0.0101 0.0493*** 0.0398*** 0.0885*** 0.0709*** -0.0239*** 0.252*** 0.0738*** 0.0601***
(0.00554) (0.00424) (0.0115) (0.00707) (0.00662) (0.00393) (0.00336) (0.00440) (0.0357) (0.00376) (0.00465)
Treat -0.00698 0.0101* 0.0119 0.00983 0.0107* 0.00282 0.0195* -0.00400 -0.00465 0.0110* 0.0166**
(0.00437) (0.00436) (0.0137) (0.00511) (0.00480) (0.00530) (0.00901) (0.0139) (0.0346) (0.00536) (0.00524)
Post  Treat 0.0367*** -0.0122*** 0.0100 -0.00345 -0.000850 0.00819 -0.0226** 0.0223 0.104** -0.0128* 0.0155***
(0.00310) (0.00269) (0.00721) (0.00566) (0.00638) (0.00503) (0.00808) (0.0126) (0.0284) (0.00622) (0.00402)
Const 4.635*** 4.628*** 4.594*** 4.633*** 4.605*** 4.626*** 4.618*** 4.603*** 4.678*** 4.638*** 4.627***
(0.00433) (0.00337) (0.0123) (0.00221) (0.00280) (0.00353) (0.00370) (0.00618) (0.0396) (0.00218) (0.00374)
Obs 42 42 42 56 98 56 56 56 14 42 70
Note: Di-in-di estimates of prices, for all pooled prices and for COICOP-2 industries (except mail and telecommunication which
does not vary at state level). I use the most disaggregated prices available for each COICOP-2. The treatment group consists of
the states where advertising taxes increased (Tirol and Burgenland). Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted from the estimation. The
pre period uses collapsed prices from 1997 to 1999, the post period from 2001 to 2003. The coecient on Post  Treat reports the
dierential eect. Robust standard errors clustered by state.
3
5Table 5: Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9)
Pool 3 years Pool, weights 1999-2001 1999-2002 1999-2003 1999-2004 1995-1997 2003-2005
Post 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.0218*** 0.0446*** 0.0614*** 0.0724*** -0.235*** 0.0334***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00202) (0.00174) (0.00158) (0.00203) (0.00473) (0.00145)
Treat 0.008** 0.008*** 0.00866** 0.00961** 0.0109*** 0.0111*** -0.00394 0.00998*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00322) (0.00291) (0.00277) (0.00297) (0.00429) (0.00465)
Post  Treat 0.006*** 0.0034** 0.00446 0.00439* 0.00472** 0.00439** 0.00489 0.00290
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00258) (0.00208) (0.00152) (0.00165) (0.00334) (0.00252)
Constant 4.624*** 4.622*** 4.633*** 4.633*** 4.632*** 4.632*** 4.849*** 4.695***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.00234) (0.00224) (0.00221) (0.00227) (0.00296) (0.00373)
Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602
Note: Di-in-di estimates of pooled prices. Most disaggregated prices available are used. The treatment group consists of the states
where advertising taxes increased (Tirol and Burgenland). Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted from the estimation. The coecient
on Post  Treat reports the dierential eect. Robust standard errors clustered by state.
3
6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beer Wine Food Non alcoholic Food in Services
drinks restaurants
Post -0.00211 0.154 -0.00332 0.0237*** 0.303** 5.846***
(0.00933) (0.149) (0.00344) (0.0055) (0.0937) (0.419)
Treat 0.114*** -0.12 -0.0491*** -0.0313** 1.285** 1.268
(0.0247) (0.0971) (0.00852) (0.0085) (0.382) (23.91)
Post  Treat -0.0312** 0.211 0.0553*** 0.0772*** -0.175 -0.839
(0.00933) (0.149) (0.00344) (0.0055) (0.104) (4.054)
Observations 14 14 132 84 126 28
Table 6: Di-in-di estimation for detailed prices. The treatment group consists of the states
where advertising taxes increased (Tirol and Burgenland). Salzburg and Vorarlberg are omitted
from the estimation. The coecient on Post  Treat reports the dierential eect. Robust
standard errors clustered by state.
Figure 4: Price response and information
Note: This gure shows the marginal average price response by industry as estimated in table
4 against information content of advertising in industries as reported in the meta study by
Abernathy and Franke (1996).
37Figure 5: Absolute price response by industry
Note: This gure shows the marginal absolute price response at level of industry classication
coicop 1 and coicop 2 against the share of advertising on state level in advertising on state and
national level from Focus data.
38Figure 6: Simulated prices
Note: This gure shows the price distribution and the cumulative price distribution from a
simulation of the model for dierent values of equilibrium advertising expenditure a. The
following parameters are assumed: v = 1, n = 3, g(a) = 4a.
39CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1072  Alberto Galasso 
Mark Schankerman 
Carlos J. Serrano 
Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights 
1071  Daniel Hale 
John Coleman 
Richard Layard 
A Model for the Delivery of Evidence-Based 
PSHE (Personal Wellbeing) in Secondary 
Schools 
1070  David Marsden  Individual Voice in Employment 
Relationships: A Comparison Under Different 
Forms of Workplace Representation 
1069  Ross Levine 
Alexey Levkov 
Yona Rubinstein 
Racial Discrimination and Competition 
1068  Klaus Adam 
Albert Marcet 
Internal Rationality, Imperfect Market 
Knowledge and Asset Prices 
1067  Yanhui Wu  A Simple Theory of Managerial Talent, Pay 
Contracts and Wage Distribution 
1066  Yanhui Wu  Managerial Incentives and Compensation in a 
Global Market 
1065  Nicholas Bloom 
Helena Schweiger 
John Van Reenen 
The Land that Lean Manufacturing Forgot? 
Management Practices in Transition 
Countries 
1064  Klaus Adam 
Pei Kuang 
Albert Marcet 
House Price Booms and the Current Account 
1063  Stephen Hansen 
Michael McMahon 
How Experts Decide: Identifying Preferences 
versus Signals from Policy Decisions 
1062  Paul Dolan 
Daniel Fujiwara 
Robert Metcalfe 
A Step towards Valuing Utility the Marginal 
and Cardinal Way 
1061  Marek Jarocinski 
Albert Marcet 
Autoregressions in Small Samples, Priors 
about Observables and Initial Conditions 
1060  Christos Genakos 
Kai Uwe Kühn 
John Van Reenen 
Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading 
Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from 
Computer Markets 
1059  Klaus Adam 
Albert Marcet 
Booms and Busts in Asset Prices 1058  Michael W. L. Elsby 
Jennifer C. Smith 
Jonathan Wadsworth 
The Role of Worker Flows in the Dynamics 
and Distribution of UK Unemployment 
1057  Fabrice Defever  Incomplete Contracts and the Impact of 
Globalization on Consumer Welfare 
1056  Fadi Hassan  The Penn-Belassa-Samuelson Effect in 
Developing Countries: Price and Income 
Revisited 
1055  Albert Marcet 
Ramon Marimon 
Recursive Contracts 




Success and Failure of African Exporters 




Gender, Productivity and the Nature of Work 
and Pay: Evidence from the Late Nineteenth-
Century Tobacco Industry 
1052  Hartmut Lehmann 
Jonathan Wadsworth 
The Impact of Chernobyl on Health and 
Labour Market Performance 
1051  Jörn-Steffen Pischke  Money and Happiness: Evidence from the 
Industry Wage Structure 
1050  Tim Leunig 
Joachim Voth 
Spinning Welfare: the Gains from Process 
Innovation in Cotton and Car Production 
1049  Francesca Cornaglia 
Andrew Leigh 
Crime and Mental Wellbeing 
1048  Gianluca Benigno 
Hande Küçük-Tuger 
Portfolio Allocation and International Risk 
Sharing 
1047  Guy Mayraz  Priors and Desires: A Model of Payoff-
Dependent Beliefs 
1046  Petri Böckerman 
Alex Bryson 
Pekka Ilmakunnas 
Does High Involement Management Lead to 
Higher Pay? 
1045  Christos Genakos 
Tommaso Valletti 
Seesaw in the Air: Interconnection 
Regulation and the Structure of Mobile 
Tariffs 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673  Fax 020 7955 7595 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk  Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  